Savage 10 Circumstances
Carol Savage was one of 166 psychiatric in-patients who took their own lives in 2004. 11 The day after voluntarily attending Runwell hospital, she was detained for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 ('the 1983 Act') with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Having made a number of attempts to leave the open acute psychiatric ward, checks on her whereabouts were prescribed for every 30 minutes. Believed to be at low risk of suicide, Mrs Savage was allegedly left unsupervised on hospital grounds, from which she was able to abscond, walking two miles to Wickford railway station before fatally jumping in front of a train.
With the coroner's jury having concluded that the hospital's preventive precautions were "inadequate", her daughter claimed that the trust had breached her mother's right to life by allowing her to escape. The House of Lords 12 therefore had to determine the test for establishing the circumstances in which a detained patient's suicide would violate Article 2. Substantive opinions were delivered by Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale, with whom Lords Walker, Neuberger and Scott concurred, the last handing down a short judgment.
Lord Rodger noted 13 that Article 2's positive obligation to protect life comprised three duties. The primary duty required the state to establish an effective system of criminal law to deter those who threatened life, backed up by law enforcement machinery to prevent, suppress and punish its breaches. Secondly, general protective measures may be required to secure the health and well-being of, for example, prisoners and patients ('the Powell duty' 14 ). These complemented the primary duty and typically obliged the relevant authorities to recruit competent staff, maintain high professional standards, and put in place suitable systems of work so as to protect life. Thirdly, in appropriate circumstances, an operational duty to protect the life of a specific individual may be imposed which was "distinct from, and additional to" 15 that general duty ('the Osman duty' 16 ).
Runwell hospital clearly owed the Powell duty to take general precautions which mirrored the position at common law. Failure to do so could amount to both negligence and a breach of Article 2. If these general steps were taken but some medical error nevertheless resulted in death, there may be liability in negligence but not under Article 2. With hospital authorities and their staff already subject to this general obligation, Lord Rodger could not see why they should not also be under the "usual complementary operational obligation" 17 to try to prevent a particular suicide. In fact, there was no valid reason for them not to. Priority had to be given to saving life in such critical circumstances; otherwise negligence and a violation of Article 2 could result.
Baroness Hale reached the same conclusion but covered "somewhat different ground along the way". The positive obligations generally required proper systems to be put in place. But in some circumstances a protective duty towards a particular individual was triggered, although not by ordinary medical negligence alone. There was "little doubt that it [was] Kingdom (1998) .
patients detained under the 1983 Act. After all, the ECtHR had recognised the authorities' obligation to provide necessary healthcare to those detained and it was "difficult to distinguish between different classes of people deprived of their liberty by the state." 18 Indeed, more of their ordinary civil rights were deprived as compared with other forms of detainee. Thus, if the hospital authority knew, or ought to have known, of a real and immediate risk that Mrs Savage would commit suicide, Article 2 imposed an operational obligation on them to do all that could reasonably be expected to prevent it.
When to Save A Life
Article 2's positive limb is broad-shouldered. It applies to "any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake". 19 But, in principle, it falls within the state's margin of appreciation to choose the means for fulfilling its tripartite set of obligations. 20 English criminal law is expected to satisfy the demands of the primary duty, although not all threats to life are deterred; suicide being the obvious example. 21 In fact, criminalising all actions and omissions that put life at risk would no doubt violate other Convention rights.
The general duty is more practical than the primary duty and requires the state to make regulations compelling public authorities to adopt appropriate measures for securing high professional standards and the protection of life. It is undoubtedly owed in the sphere of public and private healthcare as regards the acts and omissions of health professionals. 22 That is to say, all hospital patients -detained or otherwiseare its beneficiaries. In the community, emergency services, including mountain and sea rescue facilities, similarly owe this duty to those whose lives are knowingly in danger. But it does not obligate any specific result. It may, for example, require a regulatory framework to be put in place for rescuing mountain climbers in distress; but it does not demand a deadline within which aerial ambulances must reach them. 23 The operational duty can be far more onerous. Where others threaten the right to life, the ECtHR has recognised this obligation in a diverse range of circumstances: from policing, 24 detention release, 25 and domestic violence, 26 through to the management of dangerous activities 27 and even political journalism. 28 Where someone threatens their own right to life, Strasbourg has so far only had the opportunity to recognise the obligation being owed to prisoners 29 and army conscripts. 30 But how far down the path of suicide prevention might the positivity of Article 2 be prepared to go? Savage acknowledged the duty being owed to psychiatric patients detained for treatment. Logic would 18 At [101] . 19 Furdík v. Slovakia (2009) 48 EHRR SE9 146, 157; Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2005) (Application no. 33401/02, 9 June 2009 ). 27 Öneryıldız v. Turkey (2004 41 EHRR 325; LCB v. United Kingdom (1998 ) 27 EHRR 212. 28 Gongadze v. Ukraine (2006 43 EHRR 44. 29 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913. 30 Kilnic v. Turkey (Application no. 40145/98, 7 
Informal Patients
Melanie Rabone was informally admitted to a locked ward at Stepping Hill hospital suffering from depression. She was subject to 15 minute observations having attempted suicide three times in the previous seven weeks. With her mood appearing to lift, the psychiatrist granted her request for home leave. The following day she hanged herself from a tree in Lyme Park. The trust accepted negligence but denied any breach of her right to life.
Clearly the general obligation was owed by the trust: institutional precautions therefore had to be taken to protect patients from committing suicide. For example, competent staff had to be recruited, high professional standards maintained, and suitable systems of work put in place. Ms Rabone's psychiatrist was negligent. The medical treatment she received was fragmented and discontinuous. Staff had not been trained in the use of the trust's new care programme approach policy. Old forms were still being used. And no documented risk reassessment was undertaken before leave was granted, with no support plan having been put in place. Yet, according to Simon J., the general duty conferred by Article 2 had not been breached: the circumstances "fell far short of a failure to have a system for the assessment of risk of suicide in mental patients". 35 Clinical misjudgement and implementation of the system could be faulted; but not the system itself.
Could the operational duty have been owed to Ms Rabone who, it was held, was not deprived of her liberty? In Savage, Baroness Hale had deliberately left this question open. 36 Arguably Lord Rodger had not for " [a] ny auction in the comparative vulnerability of prisoners, voluntary patients, and detained patients would be as unedifying as it is unnecessary." 37 But Simon J. considered Savage to have drawn a distinction "between those who are detained and lack capacity, and those who are not detained and have capacity to consent or object to treatment". The House of Lords had "implicitly confined" the duty to compulsorily detained patients.
A growing body of empirical research suggests that some patients detained under the 1983 Act in fact retain capacity to consent to admission and treatment. 38 Conversely, many informal patients lack such capacity. 39 So to rely upon incapacity to justify the operational duty does not provide the answer to the Osman question. Nor, it is respectfully submitted, does the fact of being detained; otherwise the ECtHR would not have recognised the duty being owed to suicidal army conscripts. 40 Thus, its scope cannot be limited solely to those deprived of their liberty by the state. 41 Simon J. also rejected the assumption of responsibility approach: "All hospitals assume responsibility for the safety and treatment of patients; but that does not mean that the operational duty under Article 2.1 arises in relation to all patients. On the contrary, it is clear that it does not." Instead, the "important factor" was "the exercise of coercive powers over an individual who (by reason) [sic] of the exercise of such powers is particularly vulnerable". This was missing and so the duty could not be owed.
The 'coerced vulnerability' justification for recognising the operational duty is novel and reflects the growing realisation that "[i]n many respects human rights law is all about the protection of the individual from undue coercion". 42 Unfortunately, however, Simon J. does not expand upon it, save to say that "voluntary mental health patients can leave when they want, are not deprived of any Convention rights and have input in their own medical treatment". Szmukler and Appelbaum 43 have sought to particularise the concept of coercion by describing a "spectrum of pressures" ranging from persuasion, interpersonal leverage, and inducements or offers, through to threats and the use of compulsion. Why was Ms Rabone not subject to the necessary degree of coercion, bearing in mind that she would have been detained under the 1983 Act had she attempted to leave the ward? Would her comparative vulnerability with compulsorily detained patients not be as unedifying as it is unnecessary? 44 Where life is threatened by others, the operational duty is capable of being owed in circumstances where the state is not exercising coercive powers. In Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council, 45 for example, a man repeatedly threatened to kill his next-door neighbour. Both were council tenants. The local authority convened a meeting with the aggressor, at which he lost his temper and became abusive. An hour later he killed the neighbour. The majority of the House of Lords asked the Osman question but decided that the duty had not been triggered because the local authority could not have known of any real and immediate risk to his life. Nothing was said or done on the day to alert them of any attack, let alone a risk of death.
Should the right to life be protected differently when life is threatened by one's own actions? Ms Kerrie Wooltorton suffered from personality disorder. 46 She had ingested antifreeze before accepting lifesaving dialysis on up to nine previous occasions. She swallowed it a final time, called the ambulance services and, it is reported, capacitously refused treatment, knowing that she would die. Did the consultant renal physician violate Article 2 by failing to take reasonable steps to avert the real and immediate risk to life? Would it make a difference if someone else had administered the poisonous substance if she was still refusing treatment? 40 Ibid. n30. 41 See also Bulut v. Turkey (Application no. 51480/99, 3 July 2006) 
